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Abstract 
The interdependency of information security risks poses a significant challenge for firms to 
manage security. Firms may over- or under-invest in security because security investments 
generate network externalities. In this paper, we explore how firms can use three risk management 
approaches, third-party cyberinsurance, managed security service (MSS) and risk pooling 
arrangement (RPA),  to address the issue of investment inefficiency. We show that compared with 
cyberinsurance, MSS is more effective in mitigating the security investment inefficiency because 
the MSS provider (MSSP) serving multiple firms can endogenize the externalities of security 
investments. However, the investment externalities may discourage a for-profit MSSP from serving 
all firms even on a monopoly market. We then show that firms can use RPA as a complement to 
cyberinsurance to address risk interdependency for all firms.  However, the adoption of RPA is 
incentive-compatible for firms only when the security investments generate negative externalities.  
   
Keywords:  Information security, cyberinsurance, risk pooling, risk management, managed 
security service, economics of information systems 
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Introduction 
Information security has become a major concern for public and private organizations. Studies indicate that security-
related spending accounts for a significant portion of IT expenditure. According to the 2008 CSI Computer Crime 
and Security Survey (Richardson 2009), 47% respondents reported that their organizations allocated more than 5% 
of their IT budget to information security. In academia, information security has drawn a tremendous amount of 
attention. Researchers have addressed information security from technical perspectives (e.g., Garfinkel et al. 2002; 
Muralidhar et al. 1999; Sarathy and Muralidhar 2002), economic perspectives (e.g., Cavusoglu et al. 2004; 2005; 
Gal-Or and Ghose 2005; Ghose and Rajan 2006; Gordon and Loeb 2002, 2006; Kannan and Telang 2005; 
Parameswaran et al. 2007; Zhao et al. 2008), and organizational perspectives (e.g. Gattiker and Kelley 1999; Loch et 
al. 1992; Straub and Welke 1998; Tanaka et al. 2005). A central research question is how firms can allocate security 
expenditures in an effective and efficient way.  
An issue long plaguing researchers and practitioners is the interdependency of information security risks. Over the 
Internet, organizations and individuals are linked either physically or logically and information security risks are 
intricately interrelated. The risks faced by one organization depend on not only its security strategies but also 
others’. In other words, an organization’s security investment mitigates its security risks, as well as affects those of 
others. The network externalities of security investments often induce firms to invest inefficiently from a social 
planner’s perspective (Kunreuther and Heal 2003; Ogut et al. 2005; Powell 2005). This paper examines three risk 
management approaches and explores solutions to this issue.  
Previous literature has identified both the underinvestment and overinvestment issues caused by the interdependent 
nature of security risks (e.g., Kunreuther and Heal 2003; Powell, 2005). When security risks are positively 
interdependent and thus the organizations’ security investments generate positive externalities 1 , self-interested 
organizations invest lower than the socially optimal level (Kunreuther and Heal, 2003; Ogut, et al. 2005). For 
example, if a hacker breaks into one firm’s network, he may steal sensitive data about its partners or penetrate into 
its partners’ networks via the trust connections. In this case, a firm’s security investment not only strengthens its 
protection, but also reduces the likelihood of other firms having security breaches. Examples of security practices 
with positive externalities include antivirus software and firewalls. Self-interested organizations tend to ignore the 
positive externalities and underinvest in information security protections. 
When security risks are negatively interdependent and thus organizations’ security investments generate negative 
externalities2, self-interested organizations invest higher than the socially optimal level. Negatively interdependent 
security risks are often associated with targeted attacks. A targeted attack refers to a malware attack aimed 
exclusively at one organization or organizations within a small subset of the general business population. According 
to the 2008 CSI Computer Crime and Security Survey(Richardson 2009), 32% of respondents reported their 
companies experienced such attacks in the past year. In targeted attack, hackers generally target firms with less 
security protections. Thus, a highly protected website can divert hackers to other websites and increase others’ 
risks3. Individual websites often ignore the negative impact of their investments on others’ security and may invest 
more than the socially optimal level. The issue of overinvestment in security, although received relatively little 
attention, has been evidenced in some studies. For instance, a Symantec research investigated the efficiency of 
firms’ IT risk management programs and the levels of IT risks they experience, and found that some organizations 
are addressing IT risks through overinvestment (Symantec 2007). In this paper, we consider both overinvestment 
and underinvestment caused by the interdependency of information security risks.  
                                                           
1 Positive interdependency of security risks means that if a company has higher security risks, other companies have higher 
security risks. In this regard, when a company invests more in security protections, it not only better protects itself but also better 
protects other companies. Thus, the security investments generate positive externalities. 
2 Negative interdependency of security risks means that if a company reduces its own security risks, it threatens other companies’ 
security. In this regard, when a company invests more in security protections, it reduces other companies’ security levels. Thus, 
the security investments generate negative externalities. 
3 In a similar scenario, Ayres and Levitt (1998) find that increasing home security by one home owner increases neighbors’ 
likelihood of being attacked. 
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Researchers and practitioners have long been studying how to help firms optimally allocate security resources. In 
this research, we examine three risk management approaches to addressing investment inefficiency caused by the 
interdependent security risks. We first consider third-party cyberinsurance. Cyberinsurance is a range of first-party 
and third-party coverage that enables firms to transfer their security risks to the commercial insurance market. 
Examples of cyberinsurance policies include AIG’s NetAdvantage, Lloyd’s e-Comprehensive, Chubb’s 
CyberSecurity, Hiscox’s Hacker Insurance, etc. The coverage of cyberinsurance includes damages in loss/corruption 
of data, business interruption, liability, cyber extortion, public relations, criminal rewards, cyber-terrorism, and 
identity theft. Cyberinsurance has been proposed as a promising approach to managing information security risks 
and optimizing security expenditures (Gordon et al. 2003; Kesan et al. 2005; Ogut et al. 2005; Varian 2000). With 
cyberinsurance, firms can balance their expenditure between implementing security protections and purchasing 
insurance, and thus prevent firms from investing in cost-ineffective protections. However, we show that 
cyberinsurance cannot address the issue of investment inefficiency caused by interdependent security risks.   
We next consider managed security service (MSS, or IT security outsourcing). MSS providers (MSSPs) provide a 
range of security services, such as security monitoring; compliance auditing; information security risk assessments; 
vulnerability assessment and penetration testing; managed spam services; anti-virus and content filtering services; 
network boundary protection; incident management, including emergency response and forensic analysis; data 
archiving and restoration; and on-site consulting (Allen et al. 2003; Ding and Yurcik 2006). The 2008 CSI Computer 
Crime and Security Survey reported that as high as 39% respondents outsourced part or all of computer security 
functions. In addition, 5% respondents indicated that their companies outsourced more than 60% of security 
functions (Richardson 2009). The global MSS market is forecasted to more than double between 2007 and 2011, 
when it will reach $13.8 billion (Infonetics Research 2008).  
We show that compared with cyberinsurance, MSS has an advantage in addressing investment inefficiency caused 
by both positive and negative externalities of security investments. MSS enables firms to delegate the security 
decisions to the MSSP. To make the MSSP’s incentive aligned with the client firms’ interests, firms can use the 
service level agreement (SLA) to specify performance expectations, establishes accountability, and details remedies 
or consequences if performance or service quality standards are not met (Allen et al. 2003). Consequently, firms can 
transfer not only IT security investment decisions but also their security risks to MSSPs. Since a MSSP collectively 
manages the interdependent security risks for multiple client firms, it can internalize the externalities of security 
investments when making investment decisions for firms.  
Although MSS can be used to endogenize the externalities, we find that the MSSP may not be willing to serve all 
firms, even on a monopoly MSS market. The key insight is that the security investments made by the MSSP can 
indirectly benefit other unenrolled firms through externalities. This makes unenrolled firms even less willing to use 
MSS. Therefore, if the MSSP intends to serve more firms, it has to lower the service fee charged for MSS. As a 
consequence, MSSP may not serve all firms and the socially optimal security investments cannot be achieved. 
We then consider the solution of the risk pooling arrangement (RPA). RPA refers to the mutual form of insurance 
organizations in which the policyholders are also the owners. Examples of RPA include group captive insurance 
companies, risk retention groups, self-insurance groups, etc.4 Mutual insurance was widely adopted in the insurance 
market for medical malpractice and municipal liability during the late 1980s (Ligon and Thistle 2005), and has since 
been used also in other lines of insurance, such as employee pension and employee health insurance. The traditional 
advantages of RPA over commercial insurance include reduced overhead expense and flexible policy development 
(Swiss Re 2003).  
RPA is different from third-party cyberinsurance in terms of risk transfer. It can never completely eliminate the risks 
for an individual policyholder. Even though the risk pool can issue full coverage for individual firms’ security 
losses, each individual firm has to bear part of the risk pool’s loss through its equity position. This is equivalent to 
the case that firms share their risks with one another. Since a firm’s payoff is influenced by other firms’ security 
                                                           
4 Group captives are special insurance companies that are set up by a group of companies to insure their risks. Many large 
corporations have their own single-parent captives. From 2000 to 2004, net premiums written in the captive insurance industry 
grew by 56 percent, reaching more than $50 billion. Risk retention groups (RRG) are insurance institutions in which companies 
in a common industry join together to provide members with liability insurance. In 2005, RRG’s gross written premium reached 
$2.5 billion. Self-insurance groups are insurance entities in which companies in similar industries or geographic locations pool 
resources to insure each other’s risks. In 2003, gross written premium of self-insurance groups reached $44 billion (Swiss Re 
2003).  
Information Systems Security and Privacy 
4 Thirtieth International Conference on Information Systems, Phoenix, Arizona 2009 
losses, it will consider other firms’ security levels when making its investment decision. The risk sharing capability 
of RPA makes it possible for firms to endogenize the externalities of security investments and resolve the 
investment inefficiency.  
We find that the effectiveness of RPA is contingent on the nature of interdependency. Even though RPA enables 
firms to endogenize both positive and negative externalities of security investments, the adoption of RPA is 
incentive-compatible for firms only in the case of negative externalities. The key reason is that by pooling risks of 
individual firms, RPA induces moral hazard, which refers to firms’ reluctance to invest in loss prevention when they 
can transfer security losses to others (Lee and Ligon 2001). The moral hazard is desirable when security investments 
generate negative externalities and firms overinvest. However, in the case of positive externalities, moral hazard 
further reduces the firms’ investment incentives and exaggerates the underinvestment problem. 
The contribution of this paper is threefold. First, by proposing the solutions of MSS and RPA, this study expands the 
view on addressing the investment inefficiency caused by interdependent information security risks. Previous 
studies on cyberrisk management primarily focused on cyberinsurance. In the context of interdependent risks, 
cyberinsurance however is inefficient in inducing efficient security investments. Therefore, this paper provides new 
insights on the use of alternative solutions in IT security risk management. In addition, we consider the 
implementation issue of these solutions.  Some other potential solutions are difficult to implement. For example,  
although the imposition of liability among firms is proved to be effective in endogenizing security externalities 
(Ogut et al. 2005), it is difficult for organizations to trace and enforce liabilities in the Internet environment. In 
contrast, MSS is available in the market and RPA can be implemented by following the standard processes of 
mutual insurance organization. In addition, the adoption of MSS and RPA is proved to be incentive-compatible for 
individual firms.  
Second, this paper contributes to the stream of research on IT security outsourcing. It has been well recognized that 
firms outsourcing security services can benefit from cost saving, staffing, skills, security awareness, dedicated 
facility, liability protection and round-the-clock service (Allen et al. 2003). This paper illustrates that the use of MSS 
can also be justified from the perspective of mitigating the investment inefficiency caused by risk interdependency. 
In this regard, even if the MSSPs do not necessarily have the cost advantages or technological advantages in 
managing information security, they are still favorable from the perspective of social welfare.  
Finally, this paper contributes to the research on mutual insurance and alternative risk transfer (ART) vehicles. RPA, 
as an ART approach, has been recognized by practitioners as having the advantages of reduced overhead expense 
and flexible policy development (Swiss Re 2003). This paper, on the other hand, finds that RPA can be a solution to 
the interdependent security risks and help firms optimize their security spending. This finding generates important 
implications for the policy makers regarding the regulation of the insurance industry. Although the capacity limit of 
the commercial insurance market stimulates the demand for ART solutions, the development of RPA is still highly 
subject to regulatory attitudes. Therefore, it is important for policy makers to recognize the potential benefit of RPA 
in security management in the context of risk interdependency. Such recognition can help guide the development of 
appropriate policies for RPA and improve social welfare overall.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews related literature on economics of information 
security, insurance, MSS and RPA. In section 3, we outline the model setup. Section 4, 5 and 6 examine the uses of 
cyberinsurance, MSS and RPA in managing interdependent security risks respectively. In section 7, we discuss the 
managerial and policy implications, and then conclude the paper with future extensions. 
Related Literature 
Prior research on economics of information security has studied many issues regarding information security 
investments. Anderson and Moore (2006) discuss how moral hazard and adverse selection problems distort firms’ 
incentives to invest in information security. Gordon and Loeb (2002) develop an economic model to determine the 
optimal investment in information security. Gordon and Lucyshyn (2003), and Gal-Or and Ghose (2005) examine 
firms’ incentives to share security information and show that information sharing and security investment 
complement each other. Kunreuther and Heal (2003) characterize a class of interdependent security risks and 
demonstrate that firms generally underinvest in security protections when their security risks are interdependent. Our 
paper complements this stream of research by exploring implementable solutions to the investment inefficiency 
caused by independent information security risks.  
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There is an emerging body of literature examining the role of insurance in the area of information security. Gordon 
et al. (2003) and Kesan et al. (2005) discuss the advantages of using cyberinsurance to manage information security 
risks. Ogut et al. (2005) use an economic model to examine firms’ investments in security protections and their use 
of cyberinsurance in the context of interdependent security risks. All of these studies focus on the third-party 
commercial cyberinsurance. This paper examines RPA and MSS in addition to third-party cyberinsurance.    
IT security outsourcing has not received adequate research attention until recently. Allen et al. (2003), Axelrod 
(2004) and McQuillan and Hill (2007) summarize various issues on outsourcing IT security services and provide 
organizations guidance to knowledgeably engage MSSPs. Ding, et al. (2005) study the moral hazard problem in IT 
security outsourcing. They show that an optimal contract should depend on both the current performance and the 
reputation of the MSS, and the influence of performance decreases as the reputation effect becomes more 
significant. Ding and Yurcik (2006) study IT outsourcing decisions using a simulation approach which evaluates the 
cost-and-benefit tradeoff of using MSS. They find that the MSSP outsourcing decision is relatively insensitive to 
variation in service quality but hypersensitive to the business risk of MSSP bankruptcy.  Ding and Yurcik (2005) 
explore the impact of transaction costs on MSSPs and find that market competition drives MSSPs to cut the price 
and share transaction costs with client organizations. The network externalities associated with IT security 
outsourcing have also been examined. Rowe (2007) suggests that government should subsidize firms for IT security 
outsourcing in presence of positive externalities. Gupta and Zhdanov (2007) analytically explain the growth and 
sustainability of MSS networks. They find that initial investment is critical in determining the size of MSS networks 
with positive externalities. Our paper examines using MSS to manage interdependent information security risks.  
Prior literature on risk management has justified the existence of the mutual insurance organizations from a variety 
of perspectives. For example, the mutual form of insurance organization is more efficient when the distribution of 
risks prevents independent insurers from using the law of large numbers to eliminate risks (e.g.,Doherty and Dionne 
1993; Marshall 1974). The mutual form of insurance can also address the interest conflicts between insurers and 
policyholders, since policyholders themselves are the owners of a mutual insurer (Cummins and Weiss 1999; 
Mayers 1988; Mayers and Smith 1981). Moreover, mutual insurers may coexist with independent insurers as a result 
of adverse selection of risk-averse policyholders (e.g., Ligon and Thistle 2005). This paper complements the above 
studies by illustrating the advantages of mutual insurance organizations from a new perspective. That is, mutual 
insurance can be used to endogenize network externalities of security investments.  
Model Setup 
We consider n risk-averse firms. Each firm has an initial wealth A. All firms have an identical payoff function U(.), 
where U(.) satisfies that U'(.)>0, U''(.)<0 (i.e., U(.) is concave). The breach probability for an individual firm, say 
firm i, is determined not only by its own security investment, but also by those of others.  Specifically, we assume 
that firm i’s breach probability is µ(xi, X-i) where xi denotes firm i’s security investment and 
[ ]1 1 1,..., , ,...,i i i nX x x x x− − +=  denotes the security investments of firms except i.  A firm loses L in a security breach. 
Firm i’s expected payoff can be represented by  
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ), 1 ,i i i i i ix X U A L x x X U A xµ µ− −− − + − − . 
For notational simplicity, we use µi to denote µ(xi, X-i). 
Modeling Positive Externalities of Security Investments 
To model positive externalities of security investments, we follow Ogut et al. (2005) and classify security risks as 
direct risks and indirect risks. Direct risks refer to the probability that malicious hackers target a firm and break into 
its information systems directly. A firm can reduce its direct risks by investing in security protections. We use ρ(xi) 
to represent the probability that malicious hackers break into firm i’s systems directly, where xi is firm i’s security 
investment. (.)ρ is a decreasing convex function, (.) 0ρ ′ <  and (.) 0ρ ′′ > .  Moreover, (0) 1ρ ≤ . Indirect risks refer 
to the probability that malicious hackers break into a firm’s information systems through other firms’ systems. A 
firm’s indirect risks are determined by other firms’ security investments and the interdependency factor, γ. γ 
measures the probability that a firm has a security breach if another firm has a security breach, and ( )jxγρ  
represents the probability that malicious hackers break into other firms’ systems through firm j’s systems. Therefore, 
firm i’s breach probability can be expressed as 
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( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )1 1 21 1 1 ....i i i i ix x x x x x xµ ρ ρ γρ ρ ρ γρ γρ= + − + − − − +   (1). 
The first term of (1) represents firm i’s direct risks; the second term represents firm i’s indirect risks from firm 1; the 
third term represents firm i’s indirect risks from firm 2; etc. We rearrange the breach probability function as follows. 
( )( ) ( )( )1 1 1 ,  1, 2, ...i i j
j i
x x i nµ ρ γρ
≠
 
= − − − = 
 
∏ . 
In the symmetric case,  
( )( ) ( )( )( )11 1 1 ,  1, 2,...ni i ix x i nµ ρ γρ −−= − − − = . 
where x-i stands for other firms’ investments. For notational simplicity, we use  ρi to represent ( )ixρ ,  ρ-i to represent 














µ ρ γρ −−
∂
∂
′= − < , which means 









i i iρ γρ γρ
−
− −′= − − < , 
which means that firm i’ breach probability is also decreasing in other firms’ security investments (i.e., the positive 
externalities). 
Modeling Negative Externalities of Security Investments  
In the case of negative externalities, a firm’s security investment, while reducing its breach probability, increases the 
breach probabilities of other firms. For example, in the targeted attacks, hackers are more likely to choose firms with 
lax security protection. If a firm invests more than others, its investment is more effective in driving hackers away 
and lowering the likelihood of having security breaches. Security measures that are used to defend DDoS attacks, 
such as content caching and redundant network devices, are more likely to generate negative externalities. 



























xx x> . That is, if a firm’s investment is higher than the average investment of other firms, its investment is more 
effective in reducing its security risks. Otherwise, its investment is less effective. It is easy to verify that 






















 ′= > 
 
− . The breach probability of firm i is increasing in other firms’ 
investments, i.e. the negative externalities. 5,6   
Third-Party Cyberinsurance  
We assume that firms can buy insurance policy from a mature cyberinsurance market to cover their security losses. 
In the mature cyberinsurance market, firms are always charged an actuarially fair premium for the coverage.7 When 
                                                          
5 We also examined the case that the effectiveness of security investment is represented by the ratio of a firm’s investment to the 





= . The results are consistent in these two cases. 
6
 In this paper, we characterize the interdependent security risks among firms using a multiplicative function form. We also 
examined the additive function form. That is, firm i’s breach probability is ( ) ( )( ),i i i i ix X p x x xµ − = + − . We derived the similar 
results.  
7 The cyberinsurance market is mature when the competition among insurers is perfect (so that no one can exert any oligopoly 
power) and the actuarial data about firms’ security risks are available (so that risks can be accurately assessed). In reality, the 
cyberinsurance market is under-developed. There are a few insurers offering cyberinsurance and each with limited capacity. In 
addition, actuarial data on information security, breaches and damages is scarce. In this paper, we focus on the mature insurance 
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firm i purchases an insurance policy with coverage Ii, the insurance premium is i i iP Iµ= . Therefore, the insured 
firms extract all surplus and insurers always make zero profit. Firm i’s expected payoff can be represented by  
   ( ) ( ) ( )1i i i i i i i i i iU A L I I x U A I xµ µ µ µΠ = − + − − + − − − . 
We use a multi-stage game to examine firms’ investment and insurance decisions. The sequence of the game is as 
follows. (1) Each firm chooses its security investment xi (i=1…n); (2) each firm purchases cyberinsurance with 
coverage Ii (i=1…n) from third-party insurers; (3) the security losses are realized and the insurance compensations 
are made. It is assumed that firms’ security investments are observable.8 Proposition 1 summarizes the equilibrium 
of the cyberinsurance case.  
Proposition 1: When security investments generate positive (negative) externalities, firms will purchase full 
insurance, i.e. Ii=L, and invest less (more) than the socially optimal level.
9
 
Proposition 1 shows that firms underinvest (overinvest) in security when the investments generate positive 
(negative) externalities. This is in line with the findings in the existing literature (Kunreuther and Heal 2003; Ogut et 
al 2005). Commercial cyberinsurance cannot internalize the externalities of security investments, and therefore is 
incapable to resolve either the overinvestment or underinvestment issues. Liability has been proposed to address 
interdependent security risks (Kunreuther and Heal 2003, Ogut, et al. 2005). However, liability is difficult to 
implement. Since the Internet has no clear delineation of jurisdiction, it is extremely costly, even not impossible for 
enforcement powers, such as governments, regulatory agencies or trade associations, to impose liability across 
countries. 
Managed Security Service (MSS)  
We next consider the impact of IT security outsourcing on interdependent security risks. In order to separate the 
impact of risk interdependency on firms’ incentives to use MSS, we assume that the MSSP has the same level of 
security expertise as firms. We examine the case where firms can choose between outsourcing their security to a 
single MSSP and managing security in-house. If the firm manages security in-house, it can still buy cyberinsurance 
to cover risks. We assume that if the MSSP serves s firms in total, it charges a service fee ts to each client firm. If a 
client firm suffers a security loss, the MSSP compensates the client firm for the security loss L. In other words, the 
MSSP assumes the accountability of security loss. The payoff of a firm enrolling in MSS (we refer to it as the 
enrolled firm thereafter), can be represented by ( )sU A t− . The payoff of an unenrolled firm can be represented by 
( )I Is sU A L xµ− − , where ( ), ,I I M Is s s sx x Xµ µ=  represents an unenrolled firm’s breach probability, Isx represents an 
unenrolled firm’s security investment,
 
M
sx  represents the MSSP’s investment for each enrolled firm, and 
I
sX  is a 
1×(n-s-1) vector representing the security investments of other unenrolled firms. The subscript s represents the 
number of enrolled firms. In summary, a firm’s payoffs can be represented by 
( )
( )





U A L x
U A t
µ − − − −Π = 
−
 
The MSSP’s payoff is influenced by the security investments made for the enrolled firms, 
M
sx , the service fee ts that 
the MSSP charges, and the total number of enrolled firms s. The MSSP’s optimization problem can be represented 
by 





M M M M
MSSP s s s s s s
x t s
s t L x t xµ µ Π = − − + − −   
      ( ) ( )1 1. . I Is s ss t U A t U A L xµ − −− ≥ − −           (IR). 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
market to illustrate the insight that MSS and RPA can outperform the traditional insurance scheme in managing the 
interdependent risks. 
8 The common practices of the insurance industry include evaluating applicants’ protections and estimating the risks before 
issuing the insurance policy. 
9 To conserve space, the proofs of all propositions are not included here but are available from the authors upon request.  
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where ( ),M M Is s sx Xµ µ= stands for an enrolled firm’s breach probability, IsX  is a 1×(n-s) vector representing the 
security investments of all unenrolled firms. The individual-rationality (IR) constraint ensures that the enrolled firms 
are willing to outsource MSS. Note that the right-hand side (RHS) of (IR) is an enrolled firm’s payoff if it switches 
to managing security in-house, i.e., investing security protections and purchasing cyberinsurance. From (IR), we can 
conclude that the service fee satisfies that 1 1
I I
s s st L xµ − −= + , i.e. to make a firm indifferent between using MSS and 
managing security in-house, the service fee of MSS should be equal to the sum of in-house security investment and 
cyberinsurance premium. We next examine the security investments in the cases of positive externalities and 
negative externalities respectively.  
Positive Externalities 
We first consider the case that the security investments generate positive externalities. That is, breach probabilities 
are ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )11 1 1 11 1 1 1
s n s
I I M I
s s s sp x p x p xµ γ γ
− −
− − − −= − − − −  and ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
1
1 1 1 1
s n s
M M M I
s s s sp x p x p xµ γ γ
− −
= − − − −  . 
Proposition 2: When s firms use MSS, both the security investments at the enrolled firms and those at unenrolled 
firms are greater than the security investments when firms use cyberinsurance. Moreover, the security investments 
at the enrolled firms are greater than those at unenrolled firms. That is,
M I I
s sx x x> > . 
Proposition 2 reveals that in the case of positive externalities, the MSS addresses the underinvestment issue in two 
ways. First, since the MSSP jointly optimizes the security investments for enrolled firms, it considers the 
externalities of security investments and chooses a higher investment than unenrolled firms. Second, by increasing 
the investments of the enrolled firms, the MSSP also motivates the unenrolled firms to invest more. As a result, the 
underinvestment issue is alleviated (These results are illustrated later in Figure 3). 
We next consider how many firms the MSSP is willing to serve. From the social planner’s perspective, it is optimal 
for the MSSP to serve all firms so that the externalities can be completely internalized. However, it may not be at the 
MSSP’s interest to serve all firms.  






increase; and (2) and the service fee st  decreases.    
The explanation of Lemma 1 is as follows. When one more firm enrolls in MSS, the MSSP increases its security 
investments for each enrolled firms since more externalities are endogenized. The increased investments at enrolled 
firms also motivate unenrolled firms to improve their investments. As a result, both the security level of enrolled 
firms and that of unenrolled firms increase, i.e. the breach probabilities are decreased. The improved overall security 
benefits unenrolled firms by saving them expenditure on cyberinsurance. Therefore, in order to attract more 
unenrolled firms to switch from using cyberinsurance to using MSS, the MSSP has to lower the service fee. 
The fact that the MSS has to lower service fee to attract more firms can potentially limit the MSSP’s profitability. 
An important implication for the MSS market is: a MSSP may not find it optimal to serve all firms, even in a 
monopoly MSS market. We next consider the optimal number of enrolled firms. Since the close-form solution is 
intractable in this multi-player game, we use numerical analysis to illustrate this insight. We use a breach probability 
function ( ) 2xx eρ −= , which is consistent with the assumption that ( ) 0xρ ′ <  and ( ) 0xρ ′′ > . The interdependency 
factor 0.9γ = . The firm’s utility function is [ ]( ) ( 20), 0,10U x x x x= − − ∈ . This functional form is consistent with 
the assumption that ( ) 0U x′ > , and ( ) 0U x′′ < . The initial wealth A is 8 and the loss L is 6. Figure 1 shows how the 
optimal number of enrolled firms changes with the total number of firms. As Figure 1 shows, the number of enrolled 
firms is always less than the total number of firms. The linear increase of enrolled firms in Figure 1 and the 
concavity of the MSSP’s payoff in Figure 2 imply the service fee is decreasing. In this analysis, we consider risk 
interdependency as one of the reasons that firms use MSS. Even if the MSSP has the same level of security 
expertise, firms still outsource security services because the approach can internalize the externalities. If the MSSP 
has the best-in-security expertise, it may further motivate firms to pay for the services. However, when the MSSP 
serves more firms, the increased overall security level of the network environment will still eventually undermine 
firms’ willingness to pay for MSS. 
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Figure 3 compares the security investments in the cyberinsurance, MSS and socially optimal cases. Figure 3 shows 
that the security investments at both enrolled firms and unenrolled firms in the MSS case are higher than those in the 
cyberinsurance case. In addition, the security investments at enrolled firms are higher than those at unenrolled firms. 
Note that the security investments at enrolled firms first decrease and then increase. This is because when the total 
number of firms n increases from 3 to 6, the MSSP does not find it optimal to enroll more firms (as shown in Figure 
3, the number of enrolled firms stays at 2). Therefore, the increased total number of firms only exacerbates the 
externality issue and discourages both the MSSP and unenrolled firms from investing. When n exceeds 6, the MSSP 
starts to enroll more firms and internalize more externalities, and therefore, the security investments at enrolled 
firms start to increase.     
           
      Figure 1. Optimal Number of Firms Using MSS          Figure 2. MSSP’s Expected Payoff 
  
Figure 3. Security Investments Figure 4. Firms’ Expected Payoffs 
                  
The fact that the use of MSS by enrolled firms also benefits unenrolled firms leads to the following interesting 
result.  
Proposition 3: The unenrolled firms have higher expected payoffs than enrolled firms.    
Although the MSS addresses the underinvestment issue and improves the overall security, the benefits for the 
enrolled firms are appropriated by the MSSP through the service fee. In contrast, the unenrolled firms benefit from 
the improved security, but do not need to pay the MSSP. As a result, the unenrolled firms obtain higher payoffs than 
the enrolled firms. Then the question is why enrolled firms are still willing to use MSS? It is because if an enrolled 
firm chooses to step out, both the MSSP and the unenrolled firms will lower their investments and all firms will 





By unenrolled firms 
Cyberinsurance case 
Optimal investment 
By MSSP for enrolled firms 
Information Systems Security and Privacy 
10 Thirtieth International Conference on Information Systems, Phoenix, Arizona 2009 
Negative Externalities 
We then consider the case where security investments generate negative externalities. In this case, the breach 
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x x x− −− −= + . In this case, the security investments made by the MSSP for enrolled 
firms are lower than the security investments made by unenrolled firms. In the numerical analysis, we assume that 
the breach probability function is p(x)=e-x/2. This functional form is consistent with the assumption that ( ) 0p x′ <  
and ( ) 0p x′′ > . The analysis shows that the security investments at the enrolled firms and unenrolled firms are lower 
than those in the cyberinsurance case. In particular, 
M I I
s sx x x< < (see Figure 5). As a result, the payoffs of enrolled 
firms and unenrolled firms in the MSS case are higher than the firms’ payoffs in the cyberinsurance case (see Figure 
6). Similar to the case of positive externalities, the MSSP is not willing to serve all firms. Figure 7 shows that the 
number of enrolled firms is smaller than the total number of firms except the total number of firms is 3. The 
increasing number of enrolled firms and the decreasing MSSP’s payoff (see Figure 8) imply that the externalities 
constrain the service fee.  
 
  
Figure 5. Security Investments Figure 6. Firms’ Payoffs 
  
Figure 7. Optimal Number of Firms Using MSS Figure 8. MSSP’s Payoff 
 
Optimal investment 
By MSSP for enrolled firms 
By unenrolled firms 
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Risk Pooling Arrangement 
Although MSS can be a potential solution for the interdependent information security risks, the MSSP may not be 
willing to serve all firms. In this regard, MSS cannot be used to eliminate the investment inefficiency for all firms. 
In this section, we study an alternative approach, risk pooling arrangement, which can potentially address the 
investment inefficiency of all firms.  
We model RPA as follows. We use q to denote the ratio of loss covered by the risk pool. Assume that k out of n-1 
firms (excluding firm i) have a security breach. If firm i also suffers a security breach, each of the other n-1-k  firms 
must compensate firm i an amount of qL
n
 and firm i will obtain 
( )1n k qL
n
− −
 in total. If firms i does not suffer any 
security breach, it must compensate each of the k suffering firms an amount of qL
n
. As a result, firm i has to 
compensate kqL
n
 in total to the k suffering firms. 
Since RPA may not cover all the risks for firms, firms can purchase third-party cyberinsurance from the insurance 
market in addition to RPA. Again, it is assumed that the cyberinsurance market is mature. The principle of 
indemnity 10  requires that the cyberinsurance coverage satisfies that ( )1iI q L≤ − , that is, the total insurance 
compensation (from both RPA and cyberinsurance) cannot exceed the total loss. The expected payoff of firm i can 
be represented by  
     
( )( ) ( )( )
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Π = − − + + − −
+ − − − − −
∑
∑     
                   . .   (1 ) .is t I q L≤ −  
where ( ),j j jx Xζ µ −=  represents the breach probability of firm j (j ≠ i) and the subscript j is dropped in the 
symmetric case; and ( )( ) ( ) 1( 1)!
( 1 )!!
, 1 , 1
n kn k
n kk
b k n ζ ζ ζ
− −−
− −
− = −  denotes the binomial probability that k out of n-1 firms 
have security breaches. 
The sequence of the game is as follows. (1) n firms cooperatively choose q; (2) given q, each firm noncooperatively 
chooses its security investment xi (i=1..n); (3) each firm purchases cyberinsurance with coverage Ii (i=1..n) from 
third-party insurers; (4) the security losses are realized and the insurance compensations (of both third-party 
insurance and RPA) are made. The following Lemma characterizes the complementary relationship between RPA 
and cyberinsurance. 
Lemma 2: When firms use both RPA and third-party cyberinsurance, Ii=(1-q)L. That is, if the risk pool does not 
provide full coverage, firms will buy third-party insurance to cover the residual risks. 
Lemma 2 shows that risk-averse firms always choose to hedge against all risks. If the risk pool covers only part of a 
firm’s risks (i.e. q<1), the firm will use the cyberinsurance to cover the residual risks. Thus, firm i’s expected payoff 
can be represented by 
( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
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Π = − − − − −
+ − − − − − −
∑
∑
                              
Section 4 (Proposition 1) shows that if a firm chooses to manage the security risks only using third-party 
cyberinsurance, it will purchase a full insurance policy (Ii = L) from a third-party insurer and completely transfer its 
risks to the cyberinsurance market. In contrast, if a firm adopts RPA, it still retains part of the risks since it is an 
                                                          
10 The principle of indemnity is an insurance principle stating that an insured may not be compensated by the insurance company 
in an amount exceeding the insured's economic loss. 
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equity holder of RPA. Presumably, a risk-averse firm always wants to minimize its risk exposure and prefers third-
party cyberinsurance to RPA. However, in the context of interdependent security risks, third-party cyberinsurance 
may not be superior since it cannot eliminate network externalities of security investments. The question is: with 
interdependent security risks, do firms have an incentive to use RPA as a complement to the cyberinsurance market? 
We will show next that the RPA solution is implementable in the case of negative externalities but not in the case of 
positive externalities.  
Negative Externalities 
We first consider the case that the security investments generate negative externalities. That is, the breach 






















Proposition 4: When security investments generate negative externalities and firms have access to a mature 
cyberinsurance market, firms have an incentive to adopt RPA as a complement to cyberinsurance, i.e., q>0. 
Proposition 4 generates an important implication. That is, when firms overinvest due to the negative externalities of 
security investments, the adoption of RPA as a complement to the third-party cyberinsurance is incentive-
compatible. In other words, individual firms are willing to pool their security risks using RPA. To illustrate this 
incentive-compatibility, we derive the marginal impact of q on firm i’s expected payoff when q=0, 
( ) ( )( ) ( )0 11| ji q i i i i i i i i
jj i
xnU A L x L U A L x L L U A L x L
q n n x q
ζµ µ µ µ ζ µ=
≠
∂ ∂Π ∂−′ ′ ′= − − − − − + − − −  ∂ ∂ ∂ 
∑ .     (2) 
The first term of (2) represents the marginal benefit that a firm obtains from the reduced cyberinsurance premium. In 
another word, when the coverage of the risk pool q increases, a firm will purchase a smaller cyberinsurance 
coverage Ii and hence pay a lower premium µiIi to the commercial insurer. The second term of (2) represents the 
marginal loss that a firm incurs from exposing to more risks within the risk pool. In particular, 1
in
Lµ  represents the 
marginal loss that a firm incurs from retaining its own security damage and 1n
n
Lζ−  represents the marginal loss that 
a firm incurs from compensating others in the risk pool. The third term of (2) represents the marginal impact of other 
firms’ security investments on the firm’s payoff. It is worth remarking that the third term of (2) is positive, which 
means that the firm benefits from the reduced investments of others. As the first two terms cancel out in a symmetric 




=∂ > ), and thus 
firms always have an incentive to set up a risk pool.  
Next, we consider how firms allocate their risks between RPA and cyberinsurance. We first present a set of 
numerical results which illustrate the ratio of risks allocated to the risk pool (i.e., q), the equilibrium investment and 
the payoff of the firm when n increases. Then we analytically show a key result that the firm’s security investments 
and expected payoff approach the socially optimal levels when n approaches infinity.   
In the numerical analysis, we use the same specifications as in Section 5.2. Figure 9 illustrates the optimal ratio of 
loss that firms will share within the risk pool. The horizontal axis represents the number of firms and the vertical 
axis represents the ratio of loss that firms allocate to the risk pool. The curve shows that the proportion of loss 
shared in the risk pool decreases as the size of the risk pool increases. The reason is that when there are more 
members in a risk pool, the moral hazard becomes more severe and firms have less incentive to invest in security, 
which increases firms’ risk exposure within the risk pool.  As a result, firms choose to allocate less risk to the risk 
pool and buy more insurance from the cyberinsurance market. 
Figure 10 compares the firm’s security investments in the cyberinsurance, the RPA and the socially optimal cases. 
The firm’s security investment drops significantly in the RPA case compared with that in the cyberinsurance case. In 
addition, as the number of firms increases, the security investment in the RPA case keeps decreasing and approaches 
the socially optimal level from above. Note that firms do not underinvest in security even though moral hazard 
becomes severe within the risk pool. The reason is that firms can control the extent of moral hazard by limiting the 
coverage of the risk pool (i.e., the value of q). Figure 11 compares the firm’s expected payoffs in the cyberinsurance, 
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RPA and socially optimal cases. Note that in the RPA case, the firm’s expected payoff increases and approaches the 
socially optimal level as n becomes larger.      
 
Figure 9: The Ratio of Loss Covered by the Risk Pool 
  
Figure 10: Firms’ Security Investments Figure 11: Firms’ Expected Payoffs 
 
Proposition 5: When n approaches infinity, firms’ security investments and expected payoffs approach the socially 
optimal levels. 
When n approaches infinity, in a symmetric equilibrium where µi=µ, the law of large numbers implies that the 
expected number of firms with a security breach approaches nµ. Therefore, the expected loss that a firm affords in 
the risk pool is n qL
n
µ , and a firm’s expected utility approaches  
( )( )1 iU A qL L q xµ µ− − − − .         (3) 
where µ (1-q)L is the premium paid to commercial insurers. µqL is an total compensation that firm i pays to other 
firms who have security breaches. It can be understood as a “premium equivalence” paid to the risk pool. The firm’s 
security investment can only reduce its own cyberinsurance premium µ(1-q)L. It has an insignificant impact on the 
“premium equivalence” because the “premium equivalence” of firm i is determined by all firms’ security 
investments. Therefore, by increasing q, the risk pool can reduce the firms’ incentive to invest and thus can mitigate 
the overinvestment. In the extreme case where n approaches infinity, firms essentially obtain a full insurance by 
The cyberinsurance case 
The RPA case 
Socially optimal investment 
Socially Optimal payoff 
The RPA case 
The cyberinsurance case 
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paying a total premium of µqL+ µ (1-q)L. (3) can be rewritten as ( )iU A L xµ− − . Therefore, firms obtain the 
socially optimal payoffs.   
Positive Externalities 
The preceding section demonstrates that when security investments generate negative externalities, firms will setup 
a risk pool and use it to cover a positive proportion of risks. The question here is: when security investments 
generate positive externalities, do firms still have an incentive to setup a RPA?  
In the case of positive externalities, the breach probability functions are ( ) ( )( )11 1 1 ni iµ ρ γρ −−= − − −  and 
( ) ( ) ( ) 21 1 1 1 ni i iζ ρ γρ γρ
−
− −= − − − − respectively. Proposition 6 shows firms have no incentive to setup a risk 
pool to cover a small portion of risks. 
Proposition 6. When security investments generate positive externalities, firms have no incentive to implement RPA 





=∂ < .  
Then the question is whether firms have an incentive to setup a RPA with a large coverage. Since the close-form 
solution of q in this multi-player game is intractable, we use a numerical approach to exhaustively search for the 
possibility that firms are willing to adopt a RPA. We employ a series of exponential breach probability functions, 
increasing concave utility functions and interdependency factors in our search. However, we did not find any 
parameter space in which firms have an incentive to setup a risk pool.  
The reason that the RPA is not effective is that the moral hazard associated with RPA undermines the benefit of 
RPA in endogenizing the positive externalities. By pooling security risks together, RPA generates two 
countervailing effects on firms’ security investments. First, RPA induces firms to consider the positive impact of 
their security investments on others and motivates firms to increase their investments. Second, since RPA allows 
firms to transfer their security losses to others, firms have incentives to reduce their investments and free-ride others 
(the problem of moral hazard in teams, Holmstrom 1982). In the case of negative externalities, firms have excess 
incentives to invest. The moral hazard helps mitigate the overinvestment incentive and enhance the internalization of 
negative externalities. However, in the case of positive externalities, moral hazard further reduces firms’ investment 
incentives and therefore undermines the capability of RPA in internalizing the positive externalities.  
Discussion and Conclusion 
The objectives of managing security risks include not only limiting firms’ risk exposure, but also facilitating the 
appropriate allocation of security resources. The risk management approaches considered in this paper―third-party 
cyberinsurance, MSS and RPA―differ in their capabilities of reducing risk exposure and inducing efficient security 
investments. Both cyberinsurance and MSS provide complete risk transfer. Compared with cyberinsurance, MSS 
induces more efficient allocation of security resources since the MSSP, when serving multiple firms, internalizes the 
externalities of security investments among its client firms. RPA, in contrast, cannot provide complete risk transfer. 
However, it can still help induce more efficient security investments than cyberinsurance when security investments 
generate negative externalities. Risk sharing and moral hazard associated with RPA mitigate firms’ overinvestment 
incentives. 
Managerial Implications 
In contrast to cyberinsurance whose merits have been widely recognized, MSS and RPA have not received adequate 
attention in cyberrisk management. This paper justifies the value of MSS in the context of interdependent 
information security risks. MSS can be a feasible approach to addressing both the negative externalities and positive 
externalities of security investments. Managers of firms whose information security risks are interdependent may 
consider using common MSSPs to manage risks. The key to the effectiveness of MSS in the context of 
interdependent risks is to make the MSSP accountable for security loss of its clients. It ensures that the MSSP 
considers the network externalities of security investments when it makes decisions for each firm. Another 
implication is that even if managers do not use MSS for their organizations, they may indirectly benefit from others’ 
use of MSS. This helps managers better plan their in-house security investments.  
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A traditional advantage of using RPA is the flexibility for mutual insurers to develop and issue specialized insurance 
policies to its members. This study shows that firms can use RPA to cover the risks that are not covered by the 
commercial cyberinsurance. Therefore, managers need to realize the potential of using RPA as complement to, 
rather than substitute for, cyberinsurance. Combining cyberinsurance and RPA together can be an effective solution 
to interdependent security risks. Also, the fact that RPA is incentive-compatible only in the case of negative 
externalities implies that in using RPA, firms need to consider the nature of externalities.  
Policy Implications  
This paper also generates important policy implications for the social planner regarding the regulation of the markets 
of cyberinsurance, MSS and RPA. The competition between cyberinsurance and MSS makes it possible for firms to 
obtain more attractive policies to cover their risks. However, as this study reveals, such competition may discourage 
the MSSP from serving more firms. In this regard, the social welfare improvement may be constrained by this 
competition. The social planner may need to take into account this side effect when developing policies promoting 
these solutions.  
In general, the insurance industry is highly regulated, and the development of RPA is subject to the regulatory 
attitudes.  For example, in many jurisdictions, certain lines of insurance can only be underwritten by an admitted 
commercial insurer but not by a mutual insurer. Other factors affecting the adoption of RPA include restrictions on 
the risk pool’s underwriting terms, the deductibility of insurance premiums for corporate taxation purposes, and the 
risk pool’s access to the reinsurance market. However, considering the potential of RPA to coordinate firms’ 
security investments, it is worthwhile for the social planner to reexamine and improve existing regulatory policies on 
mutual insurance to encourage the development of RPA.  
Future Directions 
This study can be extended in many directions. First, future research may consider the situation with heterogeneous 
firms. For example, the impact of network externalities on firms depends on their scales or the degree of integrating 
with their partners. The MSSP may prefer to first enroll large firms or the firms who closely integrate with their 
partines. Also, the heterogeneity among firms may lead to the formation of different mutual organizations and 
different insurance policies. Thus, an analysis of heterogeneous firms can generate rich implications on the 
coexistence of miscellaneous mutual insurance organizations.  
The second potential extension is to consider multiple MSSPs. The competition among MSSPs may render the MSS 
a more favorable solution to interdependent firms since the competition drives MSSPs to reduce the service fee and 
share the surplus with enrolled firms.        
The third potential direction for future research is to examine the competition among commercial insurers, mutual 
insurance companies and MSS providers. For example, how commercial insurers can develop more appealing 
policies in response to the competitive threats from the mutual insurers and MSS providers. Such research will 
improve the understanding of the interaction between different risk management solutions.  
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